UNIFORM CIVIL CODE – A NEED OF THE HOUR

by

UNIFORM CIVIL CODE – A NEED OF THE HOUR

Author: Barun Garg, 
3rd year, 
Symbiosis Law School, Hyderabad.

UNIFORM CIVIL CODE

UNIFORM CIVIL CODE




    LIST OF CASES

    SUPREME COURT JUDGEMENTS


    ·     Daniel Latifi & Anr. v. Union of India. (AIR 2001 SC 3958)
    ·     John Vallamattom v Union of India, (2003) 6 SCC 611
    ·     Lily Thomas v Union of India, (2000) 6 SCC 224
    ·     Minerva Mills Vs Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625
    ·     Mohd. Ahmed Khan v Shah Bano Begum, (1985) 2 SCC 556.
    ·     Sarla Mudgal vs Union of India, (1995) 3 SCC 635

    HIGH COURT JUDGEMENTS

    ·     Arab Ahemadhia Abdulla v. Arab Adil Mahmuna Sajyabhai (AIR 1988 Guj. 141)
    ·     Ali v. Sufaina (1988 3 Cr. 147)
    ·     Assan Rawther Vs Ammu Umaa, AIR 1972 Ker 27
    ·     Jaitunbi Mubarak Shaikh v Mubarak Fakruddin Shaikh & Anr, (1999 3 Mh.L.J. 694)
    ·     Karim Abdul Shaik v Shenaz Karim Shaik (2000 Cr. L. J. 3560)
    ·     K. Kunhashed Hazi v. Amena (1995 Cr.L.J. 3371)
    ·     K. Zunaideen v Ameena Begum (1998 II DMC 468)

    RESEARCH QUESTIONS, OBJECTIVES & METHODOLOGY

    RESEARCH QUESTIONS

    The research objectives of the subject matter are as following:
    Ø To study the evolution of Uniform Civil Code and its Constitutional dilemma.
    Ø To scrutinize the concept of Uniform Civil Code and Feminist Jurisprudence.
    Ø To study Personal Laws viz-á-vizthe concept Uniform Civil Code.

    RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

    The research questions which have been explored in order to achieve the research objectives are as following:
    Ø What is the Constitutional validity of Uniform Civil Code and what has been its significance in the Constitutional Assembly debates and other literature?
    Ø How has the inter-relation between Uniform Civil Code and Feminist Jurisprudence come into picture?
    Ø What is the critical approach established by the study of Personal Laws and Uniform Civil Code?

    HYPOTHESIS

    The Hypothesis for the research of Uniform Civil Code are as following:
    Ø If the Uniform Civil Code is Constitutional, then it should be brought into existence and not just remain a scrutinizing debate.
    Ø If the Personal Laws have led to the creation of atrocities on the women and, then application of Uniform Civil Code shall bring an end to this.
    Ø  If the Uniform Civil Code is established in the country, then the chances of having a positive outcome should be more.

    CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

    At his best, man is the noblest of all animals, separated from law and justice he is the worst.  ~ Aristotle
    India as a country has no boundaries in spectrum of diversity. Our country has five major religious communities which are Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Parsees and Jews and each distinct law of its own. Not only this, among each of these communities, there is further divergence in law based on sex, sect, domicile and the form of marriage undergone. Besides this, there are still prevailing a large number of customary laws to different communities.
    There has been a very strong debate within Indian mandate to replace personal laws which are based on scriptures and customs of each major religious community in India and replace it with a common set of rules, governing every citizen. This idea was termed as the “Uniform Civil Code”. The idea of uniform civil code was broached for the first time in the Constitution Assembly Debates in 1947. The Constitution secured for us certain fundamental rights, and the right to enforce them through the courts. Other rights which could not be achieved immediately were placed in the next chapter, known as Directive Principles of State Policy. The Directive Principles of the State Policies has expected the legislature to enact a Uniform Civil Code for the country. Article 44 states that:
    “The State shall endeavour to secure for its citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India.”
    The application of Uniform Civil Code towards the territory of India has been a much debatable issue. It is more than half-a-century since Article 44 was enacted. But successive governments have not shown the necessary gumption and courage to act upon it. Though off and on, the need for a uniform civil code is debated, a small but vociferous section of the Muslim community—India’s largest minority—opposes it on grounds of religious interference; and the larger but quieter voice of gender justice is dispelled, resulting in uncertainties and continued discrimination.[1]
    Former Chief Justice of India, Justice Ganjendragadkar has observed that “in any event, the non-implementation of the provision contained in Art. 44 amounts to a grave failure of democracy and the sooner we take suitable action in that behalf, the better and that in the process of evolving a new secular social order, a common civil code is a must.”[2]
    Justice K.S. Hegde also said that, “religion-oriented laws were a concept of medieval times – alien to modern societies which are secular as well as cosmopolitan and so long as our laws are religion oriented, we can hardly build up a homogenous nation.”[3]
    Herein lies the crux of the Uniform Civil Code debate: the co-existence of personal laws alongside a principle that outlines the UCC as an ideal to strive for. This debate, with some parties arguing for a UCC while others argue against it, continues to this day. Advocates for the UCC argue that the varying personal laws allow for discriminatory practices.[4]Those against the UCC say it will impose practice of Hinduism, as it is the dominant religious group, on the entire nation. Others ar
    gue that there is no guarantee that even a common code will protect gender equality.

    CHAPTER 2: HISTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA

    The discussion regarding the pre-constitutional perceptions of members of the Constituent Assembly Debates is important before going to it constitutional explanation. The draft articles of the following members namely B.R. Ambedkar and Dr. K.M. Munshi included clauses which, though indirectly but strongly pointed towards a Uniform Civil Code.
    Dr. K.M. Munshi’s proposal stated that, “No civil or criminal court shall, in adjudicating any matter or executing any order recognise any custom or usage imposing any civil disability on any person on the ground of his caste, status, religion, race or language”[5]
    Whereas, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s proposal stated that, “to claim full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by other subjects regardless of any usage or custom based on religion and be subject to like punishment, pains and penalties and to none others”.[6]
    Moreover, in her letter of March 31, Rajkumari Amrit Kaur emphasised the importance of the uniform civil code and called it “very vital to social progress”[7]In a much more strongly worded letter, Amrit Kaur along with Hansa Mehta and MR Masani wrote that “one of the factors that has kept India back from advancing to nation- hood has been the existence of personal laws based on religion which keep the nation divided into watertight compartments in many aspects of life.”[8]And there was a demand to transfer the concept of Uniform Civil Code from the Directive principles to the Fundamental Rights.
    This was opposed by other Constitutional Assembly members like Mhd. Ismail Saheb by B Pocker Sahib, who wanted to include a right to one’s personal law in the fundamental right to religion n. Failing that, they insisted that at least the directive principle enjoining the state to provide a uniform civil code, should contain the following proviso: “Provided any group, section or community of people shall not be obliged to give up its own personal law in case it has such a law”.[9]This must be done if the right to religious practice was to have any reality because the “right to follow personal law is part of the way of life of those people who are following such laws; it is part of their religion and part of their culture”.[10]Mahboob Ali Baig Bahadur said, “People seem to think that under a secular state, there must be a common law observed by its citizens in all matters including matters of their daily life, their language, their culture, their personal laws. This is not the correct way to look at the secular state. In a secular state, citizens belonging to different communities must have the freedom to practise their own religion, observe their own life and their personal laws should be applied to them”.[11]These members were opposed to the setting up of a uniform civil code. An intermediate position was that the establishment of the uniform civil code must be done slowly, with the consent of all communities. Similar to this position was that of K M Munshi’s – who now, surprisingly, wanted to narrow the definition of religious practice. He pointed out that the personal law of Hindus was discriminatory against women and contravened an Indi
    an citizen’s right to equality. Therefore, “religion must be restricted to spheres which legitimately appertain to religion, and the rest of life must be regulated, unified and modified in such a manner that we may evolve, as early as possible, a strong and consolidated nation.”[12]Ambedkar can also be put in this group since he supported the inclusion of the uniform civil code in the directive principles but would only apply to those who wanted it to apply to them.”
    The State shall endeavor to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India[13]. The enforcement of the Uniform Civil Code is one of the Directive Principles of the State policies which are not enforceable in any court but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making these laws.[14]
    Although the Directive Principles of the State policies are not justiciable, they are as much part of the Constitution as Fundamental Rights and therefore, they deserve as much importance and attention as Fundamental Rights do.[15]Moreover, the Supreme Court has also held that not only that the Fundamental Rights should be in harmony with the DPSPs, but this harmony also is a part of the basic structure of the Indian Constitution.[16] But the Court has also stratified some of the Fundamental Rights. Some of them like Articles 14, 19 and 21, which are held part of the basic structure; the DPs are also capable of such stratification. For that reason, some of them have been shifted to the chapter on FRs such as original Article 45 or others like Article 39 (b) and (c) have been given priority over some of the Fundamental Rights. But priority to all of them over some of the FRs was found against the basic structure of the Constitution.[17]Accordingly, while DPs such as in Articles 38, 39, 39-A, 41, 43, 47 need to be attended on priority basis the ones like in Article 44 or Article 49 may wait until appropriate opportunity comes for their realisation. That is the reason that after having expressed some urgency in Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India[18]for the realisation of the goal in Article 44 it disclaimed having expressed any such urgency in Lily Thomas v. Union of India[19]and John Vallamattom v. Union of India[20]. Earlier in Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum[21]an attempt by the Court to give relief to a Muslim woman in the light of Article 44 boomeranged requiring the Parliament to take remedial step in the form of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. The Act may have given a better protection to Muslim women than she had before under the Muslim law, it is a step not in the direction but rather against the uniform civil code as there were no attempts to have uniformity.
    The meaning of the word Secularism according to the Merriam-Webster dictionary is “Indifference to or rejection or exclusion of religion and religious considerations.” The word secularism was not there in the Constitution until twenty-six years later, wherein 1976, the words secularism was added in the Constitution of India.[22]There have been judgements that secularism was an implied idea in the Constitution of India. It was just made explicit through the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution. The Secularism in Indian Constitution is originally based on ‘equal respect’.[23]This might also be called the Nehruvian idea o
    f secularism where the State respects and tolerates all the religions. This type of secularism is based on the idea of inclusion of all rather than the idea of exclusion. Nehru has also written that, “A secular State does not mean a religious state but it means that we respect and honor all the religions and give them the freedom to function”.[24]
    In the light of the above discussions, it is very clear that the Courts might or would’ve felt great difficulty in leaning towards uniformly dealing with the civil issues. Also, a well drafted and a well framed Uniform Civil Code is required for it to survive Judicial Activism.

    CHAPTER 3: VISITING SHAH BANO CASE & FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE SPECTRUM

    Within states with such broad spectrum of culture and communities like India, the conflicting claims that arise between the pursuit of gender equality and the protection of minority rights raise debatable concerns. [25] Indian constitutional history has long struggled with conflicts between gender equality and religious cultural claims.[26]
    The claim of feminists in Victorian Era to speak for Indian women was replicated in the claims of many Indian nationalists who saw their political roles as crucially bound up with improving the status of Indian women and safeguarding their honour against the polluting forces of the West.[27]The claims of feminists to political agency were supported by what they claimed as a special moral responsibility to save the downtrodden women of the colonies. Indian women appeared as the natural and logical white woman’s burden.
    Nehru’s interpretation was that national unity required a uniform structure in the administration of justice and the universal application of a set of general laws. If we have to move beyond the boundary of communalism then it becomes quite important to reform the separate system of personal laws inherited from British era This meant the development of a Uniform Civil Code (UCC) that would apply to all citizens, regardless of communal attachments.
    In the Shah Bano case[28], the Supreme Court departed from traditional interpretations of Muslim Personal law and referred to a more egalitarian Islam. The interpretation of the Supreme Court for choosing between Qur’anic verses provoked an outcry from conservative forces within the Muslim community. Previous judgments arriving at similar conclusions had led to a minimal response. However, the Shah Bano judgment came at a time when the communal tensions were at the peak. The Hindu rightist party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), although sitting in opposition, was gaining in popularity, leading to an increased sense of vulnerability amongst the Muslim minority.[29]The Congress Government responded to the heightening communal tensions by passing the 1986 Muslim Women (Protection on Divorce) Act, yielding to the claims of cultural conservatives within the Muslim community and attempting to reverse the Shah Bano judgment. Gender equality was subordinated to religious claims, as the Government yielded to a discourse of communalism that defined individual identities solely through religious membership.[30]
    Shah Bano’s case showcases the tensions that arise when the pursuit of gender equality comes into conflict with the religious claims of a minority group. These tensions, coupled with the communalization of politics and the marginalization of religious minorities, have proven a constant obstacle to the pursuit of gender equality in India, particularly in the field of family law. The Supreme C
    ourt ruling in the Danial Latifi case[31]represents yet another attempt to resolve these tensions. In a judgment that recognized the diversity of traditions within Islam, the Supreme Court concluded that the duty to make provisions for divorced women, as provided for under the Code of Criminal Procedure, applied equally to the Muslim community. The Court’s ruling ran contrary to the apparent intentions of the 1986 Act, and followed a series of conflicting judgments given by the High Courts in India in the aftermath. The Supreme Court concluded that the duty to make provisions for divorced woman as provided for under the Code of Criminal Procedure, applied equally to the Muslim community. The Court’s ruling ran contrary to the apparent intentions of the 1986 Act, and followed a series of conflicting judgments given by the High Courts in India in the aftermath of the Shah Bano Case[32].
    In more recent years, however, the rise of the Hindu right and Hindutva as a political phenomenon led to fears that reform of personal laws would become yet another tool to silence religious minorities.[33]Secularism became a powerful weapon in the Hindu right’s quest for power, as did the discourse of human rights.[34]Against this background, calls for a uniform civil code ran the risk of becoming a vehicle for greater Hinduization of the state and its institutions. This hijacking of the secular agenda left feminists and human rights activists without their traditional supports, reluctant to challenge the discriminatory practices of religious minorities lest this added further support to the Hindu right.
    Negotiating these conflicting agendas has raised many challenges for feminism as the pursuit of gender equality is, once again, constrained by religious claims. For some within the women’s movement, calls for reform of personal laws reflect an exclusionary impulse that denies the recognition of religious differences. As a result, while many feminists continue to campaign for a uniform civil code, the path to a just multicultural arrangement continues to be contested.
    Against a background of heightened communal tensions, an ongoing process of dialogue is essential if feminism is to avoid becoming complicit in the politics of communalism. The beginnings of such a dialogue can be seen in the Shah Bano and Danial Latifi judgments and in feminist arguments made in support of Muslim women’s claims in the debates surrounding both cases. Underpinning this dialogue is a dual-track approach to cultural conflicts, one that combines legal regulation with an expanded moral political dialogue on the competing claims at stake.[35]
    Protecting the right to liberty of conscience also requires that dissenting voices within religious communities are given a say.[36] Though accommodation is made in the name of respecting differences, dissenting voices within religious communities are given little support. A defensive liberalism seeks to resolve multicultural dilemmas by dismissing multicultural politics.
    The Supreme Court engages in a close scrutiny of the cultural claims made to support restrictions on a divorced Muslim woman’s right to maintenance. In the Shah Bano case, the Court, perhaps recognizing the heightened nature of communal tensions in India, sought to root its findings in Islam itself. In the Latifi case, the Court remained within the constraints of the 1986 Act and avoided a finding of unconstitutionality while continuing to assert the primacy of the constitutional guarantee of equality.
    Engaging in feminist critique becomes difficult where communal tensions are running high. In India, the Hindu Right had for some time, hijacked the dis- course of equality and human rights, challenging the religious laws of minority communities, not in the name of equality but rather domination. The rise of Hindutva as a political phenomenon left little space for feminism to challenge discriminatory personal laws and practices.
    Proposals to reform the personal laws of religious communities raise particular difficulties for feminism. On the one hand, many feminists have criticized discriminatory personal laws. They have called for a uniform civil code that would guarantee women equal rights regardless of their religious membership. On the other han
    d, feminists have been concerned to recognize the significance of religious and cultural differences between women and have sought to avoid the homogenizing tendencies of universal norms. A concern not to further isolate and marginalize minority communities further complicates debate. Martha Nussbaum argues that the role of religion in debates on models and multiculturalism makes criticism and scrutiny more difficult. It is, she says, a peculiarly liberal dilemma:
    “If the government defers to the wishes of the religious group, a vulnerable group of individuals will lose basic rights; if the government commits itself to respecting the equal human rights of all the individuals, it will stand accused of indifference to the liberty of conscience”[37]

    CHAPTER 4: UNIFORM CIVIL CODE VIZ-A-VIZ PERSONAL LAWS

    The terms of the current discussion on the uniform civil code and personal laws were set by the political positions which crystallised around the Shah Bano case, so that at present there appear to be only three options – support for a uniform civil code (UCC), reform within personal law; or an optional uniform civil code. Though there are different nuances within these, we feel that all three options are limited. In the present political situation where the issue of women’s rights continues to be subordinated to the imperatives of majoritarianism and minoritarianism, it is necessary to rethink the whole issue from a broader perspective based on democratic principles. We are presenting a proposal, the result of intensive discussions, which, while restoring the focus on women’s rights (as other democratic and feminist groups are trying to do), also aims to change the terms of the debate. Our intention is to intervene in the present controversy surrounding the question of legal reform and to provoke a debate on somewhat different lines. The various discrimination in personal laws are stated as following:
    1.   The Muslims law allows polygamy, but the Hindu, Christian and Parsee laws do not.
    2.   Definition of marriage under Muslim law indicates that the female witness is not equivalent to male witness.
    3.   Marriage under Muslim Law is a civil contract while under Hindu law even today marriage is regarded as sacramental union, though only partially.
    4.   Muslim males are allowed extra judicial divorce but the Hindu, Christian and Parsee, males as well as females, can affect divorce only through court.
    5.   Muslim females can get divorce only through the court of law on specified grounds. The same is the position of Hindu, Muslim and Parsee families.
    6.   Under Muslim law, husband’s apostasy from Islam results in automatic dissolution of a
    Muslim marriage though wife’s apostasy does not. Under Hindu law, a spouse converting to other religion confers on the other spouse a right to sue for divorce. The same is the position under Parsee law. Under Christian Law, apostasy does not affect the marriage but where apostate husband has married again, the wife gets a right to sue for divorce.
    7.   Under Muslim law, a divorced wife is not entitled to any maintenance, except for except for the Iddat period. The Hindu, Christian and Parsee laws permits maintenance for divorced wife till her death after the marriage.
    8.   Under Muslim law, a divorced wife cannot marry her previous husband without her being remarried to some other man who has pronounced divorce on her and has died after consummation of marriage. No such condition is there under Hindu, Christian or Parsee Law.
    9.   Under Muslim law, a daughter inherits half of the share of a son.
    10.    Under Muslim Law, a person cannot dispose more than 1/3 share of his property by will, but the other, personal laws do not impose any such limitation. In case of a joint family property among Hindus, one can dispose of his share by will and not the whole of Joint Hindu family property.
    11.    A female under Mitakshara law is not a coparcener. Coparcener consists of only male members. Such a system is not available in other personal laws. Even after passing of Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the concept of coparcenary is retained.
    12.    Muslim law recognizes acknowledgement of paternity and thus clears legitimacy of a child, while others do not recognise the same.
    13.    Muslim law, Christian law and Parsee law do not recognise adoption of child while Hindu law permits adoption.
    14.    Under Muslim law, a child born is deemed to be legitimate if born within a particular period of separation of spouses (after divorce or otherwise), which varies from 10 months to 4 years. The courts in India have refused to recognise Hanafi law, which permits 2 years separation, and Shafi law, which permits 4 years separation, as it cannot happen in the natural course of events. Hindu, Christian and Parsee laws do not confer legitimacy if the separation period is more than 270-280 days.
    As it can be evidently inferred from the list above, various discrepancies have been seen in the religious personal laws.
    Moreover, the Supreme Court has ruled in the judgement of Assan Rawther vs Ammu Umma, “Personal Law … is law by virtye of
    the sanction of the sovereign behind it and is, for that very reason, enforceable through court. Not Manu or Mohammed but the monarch for the time makes personal law enforceable … Hindu and Mohammedan Laws are applied in courts because of old regulations and Acts chanrging the Courts with the duty to administer the personal laws and not because the ancient law-givers obligate the courts to enforce the texts”.[38]

    CONCLUSION

    Uniform Civil Code has a long history of debates dating back to the Constituent Assembly Debates. Ranging from Ambedkar’s and Munshi’s view to those of Baig’s. But the constitutional objective of equality is at the heart of all the disagreements and dilemmas. There are a handful of these terms like equality, the jurisprudence on which has been very confusing.
     The undefined concept of equality is a major hurdle which needs to be addressed today. A clear interpretation by the Apex Court of these terms has become the need of the hour. Secularism has been defined to be more of inclusive than exclusive in the Indian context. However, the intention behind the 42ndConstitutional Amendment through which secularism was added to the Preamble to the Constitution points towards an exclusive concept.
    The preference of the interpretation of the Constitutional provisions has been given to the community, denomination, religion or sect over individual rights. There have been a few instances of Judgement and legislations which have prioritized communitarianism for political agendas. Vote bank politics has greatly diminished the possibility of drafting an unbiased Uniform Civil Code.
    But there have also been instances where the Part 3 of the Constitution has been given more weight. Through Judicial Activism, the women rights have been identified and given much significance and in turn, the Judiciary has taken steps towards the realization of Constitutional objectives.
    An incremental approach to the uniform rights appears to be the most effective strategy to break away from the identity politics entrapped in the controversy of the implementation of the Uniform Civil Code.

    BIBLIOGRAPHY

    STATUTES

    Ø   Constitution of India.

     DICTIONARIES
    Ø   Merriam-Webster Law Dictionary. (est. 1828)
    BOOKS
    Ø Statutory Debates Vol. II
    Ø Constitutional Assembly Debates Vol. VII
    Ø Jawaharlal Nehru Speeches, Vol. V, (Publication Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India 1983) 59.
    Ø K. Sangari, “Politics of the Possible: Essays on Gender, History, Narratives, Colonial English”, Anthem Press, pp: 405-407 (2002).  
    RESEARCH REVIEW
    Ø Arpita Elizabeth Varghese, Personal Laws in India: The Activisms of Muslim Women’s Organisation. Duke University Law Review, (April, 2015).
    Ø B. Cossman & R. Kapur, “Secularism’s Last Sigh? Hindutva and the (Mis)rule of Law”, Oxford University Press, (1999).
    Ø D. Chakrabarty, “Modernity and Ethnicity in India”, Routledge, (1998).
    Ø Ganjendragadkar, Secularism and Constitution of India 126. (1971).
    Ø G. Panday, “The Construction of Communalism in Modern India”, Oxford University Press.
    Ø K. Sangari, “Politics of the Possible: Essays on Gender, History, Narratives, Colonial English”, Anthem Press, pp: 405-407 (2002).  
    Ø K.S Hegde, Islamic Law in Modern India(Ed. Tahir Mahmood). 3 (1972).
    Ø L. Volp, “Feminism v. Multiculturalism”, Columbia Law Review. (2001).
    Ø M.P. Singh, 7he Statics and the Dynamics of the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles – A Human Rights Perspective, 5 SUPREME COURT CASES (JOURNAL) I (2003).
    Ø M. Nussbaum and J. Glover, “Women, Culture and Development”, Claredon Press, (1995).
    Ø M. Nussbaum, “Sex and Social Justice”, Oxford University Press, (1999).
    Ø Niveditha Menon, A Uniform Civil Code in India: State of the Debate in 2014. Feminist Studies 40 (2).
    Ø Shefali Jha, ‘Secularim in the Constituent Assembly Debates 1946-1950’ (2002)37(30), Economic and Poltical Weekly 3175.
    Ø T.B Hansen, “The Saffron Wave”, Princeton University Press. (1999)
    Ø U. Narayan, “Disclosing Cultures: Identities, Traditions and Third World Feminism”, Routledge, (1997).
    Ø V. Das, “Cultural Rights and the Definition of Community”, Oxford University Press, (1994).
    MISCELLANEOUS
    Ø 42nd Amendment, Constitution of India.

    FOOTNOTE:



    [1] Arpita Elizabeth Varghese, Personal Laws in India: The Activisms of Muslim Women’s Organisation. Duke University Law Review, (April, 2015).
    [2] Ganjendragadkar, Secularism and Constitution of India 126. (1971).
    [3] K.S Hegde, Islamic Law in Modern India (Ed. Tahir Mahmood). 3 (1972).
    [4] Niveditha Menon, A Uniform Civil Code in India: State of the Debate in 2014. Feminist Studies 40 (2).
    [5] SD-II p. 173
    [6] SD-II p.89
    [7] SD-II p.147
    [8] SD-II p.162
    [9] CAD-VII, p. 540
    [10] CAD-VII, p. 540
    [11] CAD-VII, p. 544
    [12] CAD-VII, p. 548
    [13] Art. 44, The Constitution of India
    [14] Art. 37, The Constitution of India
    [15] M.P. Singh, 7he Statics and the Dynamics of the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles – A Human Rights Perspective, 5 SUPREME COURT CASES (JOURNAL) I (2003)
    [16] Minerva Mills Vs Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625
    [17] Minerva Mills Vs Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625
    [18] Sarla Mudgal vs Union of India, (1995) 3 SCC 635
    [19] Lily Thomas v Union of India, (2000) 6 SCC 224
    [20] John Vallamattom v Union of India, (2003) 6 SCC 611
    [21] Mohd. Ahmed Khan v Shah Bano Begum, (1985) 2 SCC 556.
    [22] 42ndAmendment, Constitution of India
    [23] Shefali Jha, ‘Secularim in the Constituent Assembly Debates 1946-1950’ (2002)37(30), Economic and Poltical Weekly 3175.
    [24] Jawaharlal Nehru Speeches, Vol. V, (Publication Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India 1983) 59.
    [25] L. Volp, “Feminism v. Multiculturalism”, Columbia Law Review. (2001)
    [26] T.B Hansen, “The Saffron Wave”, Princeton University Press. (1999)
    [27] U. Narayan, “Disclosing Cultures: Identities, Traditions and Third World Feminism”, Routledge, (1997).
    [28] Mohammed Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano. (AIR 1985 SC 945)
    [29] K. Sangari, “Politics of the Possible: Essays on Gender, History, Narratives, Colonial English”,Anthem Press, pp: 405-407 (2002).  
    [30] G. Panday, “The Construction of Communalism in Modern India”, Oxford University Press
    [31] Daniel Latifi & Anr. v. Union of India. (AIR 2001 SC 3958)
    [32] Arab Ahemadhia Abdulla v. Arab Adil Mahmuna Sajyabhai (AIR 1988 Guj. 141); Ali v. Sufaina (1988 3 Cr. 147); K. Kunhashed Hazi v. Amena (1995 Cr.L.J. 3371); K. Zunaideen v Ameena Begum (1998 II DMC 468); Karim Abdul Shaik v Shenaz Karim Shaik (2000 Cr. L. J. 3560); Jaitunbi Mubarak Shaikh v Mubarak Fakruddin Shaikh & Anr, (1999 3 Mh.L.J. 694)
    [33] D. Chakrabarty, “Modernity and Ethnicity in India”, Routledge, (1998).
    [34] B. Cossman & R. Kapur, “Secularism’s Last Sigh? Hindutva and the (Mis)rule of Law”, Oxford University Press, (1999).
    [35] M. Nussbaum and J. Glover, “Women, Culture and Development”, Claredon Press, (1995).
    [36] V. Das, “Cultural Rights and the Definition of Community”, Oxford University Press, (1994).
    [37] M. Nussbaum, “Sex and Social Justice”, Oxford University Press, (1999).
    [38] Assan Rawther Vs Ammu Umaa, AIR 1972 Ker 27

    Leave a Comment