Author: Aayush Akar

All human rights are fundamental, inviolable and interdependent. Yet this interconnectedness is nowhere more evident than in the debate of free speech and incitement to religious or racial hatred.
The word blasphemy implies “irreverence to God, religion, a religious icon, or anything else that is considered sacred.” It has been considered a common-law felony [in the U.S.] due to its tendency to provoke peace breaches. Some of the laws specifically render crime illegal. Nevertheless, the reasoning for blasphemy being considered a felony is valid not only in common law countries but globally.[1]
Despite different demographic and legal systems, several countries worldwide have criminal laws on blasphemy. Whether the Christian states, such as Greece and Cyprus, the Islamic States such as Iraq and Egypt, Jewish majority Israel, Sri Lanka or secular states, like Canada or Germany, have laws prohibiting blasphemy all over the world. Such crime may involve a particular religion as in Qatar or all faiths like Denmark and may vary from a simple fine in Italy to the death penalty in Pakistan. It could be punishable by the death penalty in Pakistan.

However, in their criminal system, many countries have no law on blasphemy.[2]
The blasphemy law was ruled out by the United States of America as unconstitutional as it was a breach of the freedom of speech.

Being a pluralistic democracy like America, India was unable to provide for heresy until the year 1927, although Section 295(A) was part of the Indian Penal Code in 1860. It states that “Whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of any class of [citizens of India], [by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise], insults or attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of that class, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to [three years], or with fine, or with both”.[3]

In the midst of a number of provisions covering different aspects of criminal law, the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, in Section 5 completes a long debate in England and Wales on the subject of blasphemy laws. In Section 79(1): “the common law in England and Wales abolishes the acts of blasphemy”. Although many have already pronounced the offense of blasphemy dead, or at least dying, the abolition of these ancestral crimes in such an understated way has trapped many by great shock. Common law offenses of blasphemy and treason were officially repealed in England and Wales in 2008. Equivalent rules apply in Scotland and Northern Ireland but it has not been enforced for many ages.[4]


Being such a State with a predominantly Hindu population, India has never seen a blasphemy law until 1927 as “Hinduism faces no fetters on the intellect: a man may think as far as he can; there is no blasphemy in the investigation; there is nothing too sacred to be checked or questioned”. Prior to independence, Mahashay Rajpal written a brochure named Rangila Rasul in the midst of religious tensions. The Brochure caused controversy when it was published in 1926, with Muslim community leaders seeking vengeance for Rajpal as it was a vicious attack on Muslim religious sentiments. Finally, due to the lack of any blasphemy law in India, Rajpal was convicted, only to be assassinated in 1929. In the incident that it was necessary, the British colonial government eventually amended the Indian Penal Code of 1860 and in 1927 added Section 295(A). The Section is present in the Indian Penal Code, 1860, even after the partitioning of India.[5]

The blasphemy offense was primarily an intrinsic part of canon law in the UK. Throughout 1378 the prosecution of John Wycliffe and the Lollards was pursued at the behest of Pope Gregory XI. The only sanction available to the bishops at the time, however, was ex-communication. Discontented with this, the clergy forged a parliamentary act, without the consent of the Lords or Commons, allowing the heretics to be arrested and imprisoned. Parliament made an effort in the following year to defund the Act that sparked a sequence of criminal investigations and the legislation failed.

Under the reign of King Henry IV in 1400, they were not pleased with the new powers. Such additional powers enabled the Bishops to detain and jail all heresy religious leaders, all heresy-infected schoolmasters, and all heresy-infected proprietors and authors. On failure to abjure (sternly renounce) or revive after abjuration, the heretic could be handed over to public servants, taken to a high place before the citizens, and burned, so that their penalty could trigger fear into the hearts and minds of others. In April 1399 his bishop found guilty William Sawyer of heresy and put him to atonement.

He was again charged as a relapsed heretic on 12 February 1400 and was sentenced by Canterbury’s Archbishop. Sawyer was incinerated on 2 March, eight days before he was given the authority to impose such retribution. Between 1414 and 1506 there’s a huge list of those burnt and beheaded. In the 17th century, the Court of King’s Bench found heresy a common-law felony, charged by common law judges.

In 1656, James Naylor of the Quaker was accused by the Second Parliament of Protectorate of escaping, pillage, brandishing a red-hot poker on the face, fracturing his language and eventually imprisoning him permanently on hard labor. The judge, Lord Commissaire Whitelock, draws a distinction between heresy and blasphemy in prosecuting Naylor. Blasphemy against Christianity was regarded as an offense against common law from the 16th century to the mid-19th century.  Before implementing the doctrines of his new Church of England in the 1530s, Henry VIII found it an offense to express or publish any view that defied the Six Articles (1539).[6]

Blasphemy has also been used to persecute Christians, Unitarians, and others as a political method. Blasphemy has been viewed as an offense against the Church of England since 1838.  The temporal courts were to be punished with death, incarceration, corporal sanctuary and fine all accusing God, including the denial of His being or providence, all of Jesus’ reprehensible admonitions, all profane mockery at the Holy Scriptures and all their parts were disregarded or mocked. Two weavers, William Bond and Thomas Hibbard were arrested for atheistic claims in Wiltshire in 1656.

Taylor’s Case in 1676 was the very first recorded instance of the common law crime of blasphemy. It is uncertain whether or not earlier instances were unnoticed. Lord Sumner concluded, “Taylor’s instance is the central pillar of this part of the law.” In the case of Cowan v Milbourn (1867), the claimant violated his obligation to give the appellant a seminar-room, holding that the planned lessons were to prove that Christ’s integrity was flawed and that his preaching was false, and that the Bible was no more motivated than any other text, and the Court of Exchequer Chamber ruled that the publishing of such belief was blasphemy; On that day, the court reiterated that Lord Chief Justice Hale’s dictum that Religion is a cornerstone of England’s rules.[7]

In the case of Bowman v Secular Society, 1917 Lord Sumner, reiterating Hale’s statements in Taylor, articulated the stance using the Latin phrase, deorum injuriae diis curae, “The offenses against the gods are dealt with by the gods”: Blasphemy is an offense against the (Christian) state and is forbidden because it tends to undermine (Christian) society; the offense against God as such is outside the reach of the (Christian) state. John William Gott was the last person in Britain being sent to prison for blasphemy on 9 December 1921. While he was sued for releasing two pamphlets entitled Rib Ticklers, or Questions for Parsons and God and God, he had three previous convictions of blasphemy.[8]

In these pamphlets, Gott satirized the biblical story of Christ reaching Jerusalem, compared him to the muppet of the carnival. Having suffered from an autoimmune disease, he was convicted to nine months of intense labor and died shortly after its release. The incident became the focus of popular indignation. In a speech in 1949, Lord Denning inserted the legislation of blasphemy in the earlier days, stating that “the reason for this law was when it was believed that only ignorance of Christianity could rattle the social fabric which was formed on Religion itself. There’s no such threat to society now and the offense of blasphemy is a dead issue.”

The 1998 Human Rights Act mandates that the courts interpret the law in such accordance with both the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Some deem the crime of blasphemous libel to be contradictory to the Convention’s prohibitions on freedom of expression. Furthermore, a statement that the blasphemy law is incompatible with Article 10 of the Convention (providing for freedom of expression) was rebuffed in the case of Wingrove v UK (1997), just before the advent of the Human Rights Act 1998; a case brought by solicitor Mark Stephens. The Court held that for a constraint on freedom of speech it was within the margin of acknowledgment of the State. When the BBC agreed to air Jerry Springer: The Opera in January 2005, more than 63,000 emails were issued from disappointed Christian audiences who protested to the depiction of Religious symbols throughout the series (including one sequence showing Jesus pretending to be “a little gay”). The Christian Voice fundamentalist group attempted a private blasphemy criminal charges against the BBC, but the charges were dropped by the court of the magistrates of the City of Westminster.

Christian Voice applied for that verdict to be overruled by the High Court, but perhaps the application was denied, the court finds that common law blasphemy offenses explicitly didn’t apply to stage productions (section 2(4) of the Theatres Act 1968) and broadcasts (section 6 of the Broadcasting Act 1990).[9]


Section 295A penalizes discrimination against any class of citizens ‘ faiths or religious convictions if such crimes are performed in a calculated and malicious manner, in order to outrage the group’s religious sentiments. Section 295A is an offense that can be recognized, which means that the police are entitled, without the necessity of a warrant, to arrest defendants. In conjunction with the long-running hearing and decision-making of criminal cases, the very existence of Section 295A, together with its addictive potential, has a chilling impact on free speech.[10]

The only choice is for the courts, as the parliament does not demonstrate a desire to amend or repeal the law. Indeed Subramanian Swamy submitted a request last year for the declaration of unconstitutionality of different laws on hate speech under the Indian Penal Code. However, there is a major problem with regard to Section 295A: a Supreme Court bench with five judges affirmed its constitutionality in Ramji Lal Modi v State of UP in 1957. This suggests that to change its position, the Supreme Court would need at least a bench of seven magistrates, to supersede Ramji Lal Modi and put down the law.

Procedurally, this would allow the 295A claimants to first persuade a bench of two judges (before which every complaint initially goes) that there are sufficient grounds to question Ramji Lal Modi’s legality. If persuaded, this bench of two judges would have to refer the issue to a bench of five judges who, in effect (if satisfied), would have to refer it to a bench of seven judges, that would eventually decide the case on its merits.[11]

While this whole procedure is procedurally complicated and impossible to materialize, there are valid arguments, in fact, for the court to review and suggest overturning the judgment of Ramji Lal Modi. Although this whole process is procedurally intimidating and unlikely to come about, the law makes a good argument that the court must revisit and take the Ramji Lal Modi decision into consideration.

In Ramji Lal Modi, the Court held that Section 295a was constitutionally valid because it was a’ reasonable limitation’ to free speech “in the interest of public order ‘ pursuant to Article 19(2) of the Constitution. The Court’s main reasoning was that, as required under Article 19(2), the clause’ in the interests’ was very large and allowed the state to make a number of laws relating to public order. The court held that “[Section 295A] only punishes the aggravated form of insult to religion when it is perpetrated with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of that class. The calculated tendency of this aggravated form of insult is clearly to disrupt the public order and the section, which penalizes such activities, is well within the protection of clause (2) of Art. 19 as being a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(a).” In order for a law to be a reasonably restrictive limit on freedom of speech in the interest of public order, the court argues
that it should be restricted to situations in which the proscribed speech is somewhat proximate to the potential for public disturbances (for example, the invitation of an army to destroy public property, but the writing of an article in This argument was derived from previous decisions of the court, where it was held that the “reasonable” requirement meant that the language had to be proportional to the actual damage that the state feared.

Nevertheless, this claim was dismissed by the Court in Ramji Lal Modi. The flaw in the decision was that the Court focussed solely on “for the sake of” and ignored the restrictions placed by the term “reasonable restrictions. Ironically, however, the court departed from its stand within three years: in a case called the Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh v Ram Manohar Lohia, it held that there had to be a close connection between speech and public disorder, not a’ far-fetched,” remote’ or’ fanciful connection.’

The court completed this check in the years that followed: it held that the relation between expression and insanity had to be equivalent to the ‘spark in a powder keg;’ it held in 2011 that only the’ encouragement of inevitable lawless action’ talk had been prosecuted. As we can see, this needs a very high state threshold to be met before the public disorder is invoked as the basis of speech restriction. In fact, the Supreme Court in the case concerned held that mere passive’ membership in a terrorist organization, as long as the person accused had no recourse to incite violence, was not a criminal offense.[13]

And most recently, the Supreme Court, in the controversial Shreya Singhal judgment, discriminated between’ advocacy’ and’ incitement’ and held that laws restricting freedom of speech would have to be strictly modified to only contain the latter kinds of speech within their scope. Therefore, in fifty plus years following Ram Manohar Lohia’s ruling, the Supreme Court has repeatedly mocked and rejected Ramji Lal Modi’s basic foundation–that there is no provision of similarity between expression and disorder. If the proper test is one of incitement to lawless action, then it is very obvious that Section 295A’s words are far too vague.[14]

It cannot be said that intentional insult to religion or religious feelings is necessarily equivalent to’ incitement’ under no interpretation. The Supreme Court made it clear in Shreya Singhal’s Case that’ over-broad laws,’ which captured even legal and legitimate speech within their scope, would have to be declared unconstitutional because of their potential to chill core political and cultural discourse. Of note, a seven-judge bench can only take the decision to simply overrule Ramji Lal Modi, and strike down Section 295A.

Constitutional courts throughout the world agree from time to time that ancient antique rulings–rendered by judges in a different era, with specific sensitivities–were bypassed by time and changing circumstances. There is, however, nothing extraordinary or humiliating in the abolition of long-held judicial offices that are no longer affordable to modern society. The Ramji Lal Modi decision, which upholds the constitutionality of the blasphemy law, is one such judgment that has outlived its usefulness.[15]


Most nations have removed or decreased the penalties for blasphemy on different grounds Failure to identify the word religion: –Blasphemy has been defined as irreverence against God or religion; nevertheless, the concept “religion” itself requires a proper definition. Belief in God, which can unite Judaism, Islam, and Christianity, is obviously not enough, as certain religions like Hinduism may be polytheistic, and rely on belief in God or Allah, as they do not include the faith in God. Religious freedom:-Many courts have tried to define the term religion by comment or judgment. In addition, the Indian Constitution provides for freedom of conscience, freedom of practice and the dissemination of religion.

 Article 18 also protects atheistic and non-theistic views in order to broaden the term “religion” by m
eans of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. If there are enough variations to the word faith to include atheism as a religion, atheism is also entitled to religious freedom, and in many instances, the atheism in effect can be defined as blasphemy. Freedom of speech and expression:-freedom of expression and voice, which is also human rights, is a fundamental right in the constitution of various countries like India. Many international documents have given freedom of expression and speech a right that cannot be limited by blasphemy elements.

Under Article 19 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, everybody shall be free to obtain freedom of expression, to receive and to transmit all kinds of information and ideas regardless of boundaries, either orally or written in an art or through all other means he prefers, and to practice an opinion without any restriction whatsoever has long been viewed as a tool for oppressing the minority by the majority.[17]

Blasphemy is described as irreverence to God or religion, but the term religion itself does not have a proper definition. As a definition, it is clearly inadequate that we believe in God which may combine Judaism, Islam, and Christianity, because some religions, such as Hinduism, are arguably Polytheist. Similarly, a concept that relies on believing in God or God does not include Buddhism, as there is no confidence in a Deity. The US has developed two main approaches, one to identify central beliefs and the other to identify religion through analogy. All approaches are not straightforward or definitive.[18]


The United Kingdom comprises of 4 constituent countries: England, Northern Ireland, Wales, and Scotland. The “blasting” and “blasting divorce” rules were repealed in England and Wales in 2008. The books in England and in Northern Ireland are still subject to similar rules. The common law offense of blasphemy has traditionally evolved from canon law and only insulted Christianity. “Blasphemy” was punished by death in medieval times. In 1841 a “blasphemous libel” was found guilty by Edward Moxon, a magazine publisher in Percy Bysshe Shelley’s Queen Mab. The poet was sentenced to imprisonment.[19]

Lord Denning declared in 1949 that “blasphemy” now was a “mortal letter” Act. In 1977, the publishing of a new book, The Lord Who Dares to Say His Name by James Kirkup (a poem graphically sexualizing the image of Jesus Christ) was effectively revived, but several times in it was written. The publisher of the Gay News magazine was found guilty and sentenced to deferred jail sentences. It was released first in 1976. This would be the latest successful “blasphemy” prosecution in the United Kingdom. The Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 abolition of the’ blasphemy ‘ laws of England and Wales which took effect on 8 July 2008, endorsed on 8 May 2008 by Prime Minister Gordon Brown. Nevertheless, only in England and Wales were the elements of the Criminal Justice and Citizenship Act that repealed “blasphemy.” There is still regulation in Scotland and Northern Ireland. In 1843, a librarian, Thomas Paterson, was sentenced to a 15-month prison term in the last successful prosecution for “blasphemy.” “Blasphemy” was a death penalty until 1825, of which Thomas Aikenhead was the most prominent survivor.[20]

Commentators agree that in Scotland and Northern Ireland the Human Rights Act (1998) legally disenforces the’ blasphemy’ rules. This is because all courts in the United Kingdom have to interpret the law under the Act on Human Rights in such a way as to comply with the Convention on Fundamental Freedoms and Human Rights, including the freedom of expression provided for in Article 10. In Wingrove v UK (1997) however, before the passage of the Human Rights law it had been challenged that’ blasphemy’ regulation was incompatible with the right to freedom of expression, on the grounds that the state’s free speech margin could include’ blasphemy ‘ limitations. It is not, therefore, clear whether the laws in Northern Ireland and Scotland could prosecute them as they stand. It is not clear.[21]

In December 2016, the Humanist Society of Scotland again demanded the revocation of the blasphemy law by the Scottish government. Citing the Freedom of Thought Study, they acknowledged the presence of various “blasphemy” laws that remain in use around the world, and “the brutality with which those accused of violating such laws are often punished by state agents
or non-state actors, including neighbors and relatives.” Having these statute laws “should be a badge of shame for any progressive nation.”


The Indian law has a section 295A, which says that “deliberate and malicious acts, intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs will be punishable with imprisonment extending up to 3 years. The bill seeks to insert a new section 295AA that stipulates that whoever causes “injury, damage or sacrilege to Sri Guru Granth Sahib, Srimadbhagwatgeeta, Holy Quran and Holy Bible with the intention to hurt religious feelings of the people” would be liable to awarded life imprisonment if convicted. The proposed Penal Code bill seeks to replace the 2016 Punjab Amendment bill passed by Akali Dal which expressly concerned only actions of sacrilege against the Guru Granth Sahib. On legal grounds, the drafting of the bill has received criticism for the impressive manner in which sacrilege has been defined; it should have been clearly mentioned as a physical desecration sacrilege otherwise, even for writing a book or an article, or making a speech, or sketching a cartoon, or drawing a painting, a person can be erroneously accused of blasphemy notwithstanding, the rights guaranteed by article 19 and 25 of the constitution.[23]

On 9 January 2008 on the floor of the House of Commons, Dr. Evan Harris moved a new clause to the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill to abolish what he called ‘the ancient discriminatory, unnecessary, illiberal and non-human rights compliant offenses of blasphemy and blasphemous libel’.[24] In addition to the usual criticisms concerning legal uncertainty, discrimination and alleged incompatibility with the ECHR, which Dr. Harris elucidated without reference to Green v The City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court, a number of further arguments were advanced. Dr. Harris claimed that the blasphemy law was unnecessary: there were ‘enough laws dealing with outraging public decency and public order offenses are already on the statute book to ensure that the removal of these two offenses will not lead to widespread outrageous behavior in public’. Moreover, and particularly tellingly given the recent comments of the High Court, Dr. Harris contended that abolition was required because although the law had not been used for a long time, it had ‘a chilling effect’, leading to self-censorship. Referencing the objections to abolishing blasphemy at the time of debating the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill, Dr. Harris argued that there was no longer ‘an excuse for prevarication’ since ‘religious hatred was dealt with two years ago’.[25]

However, Dr. Harris was persuaded of the virtues of prevarication, withdrawing his new clause in response to an undertaking by the Government to bring forward its own new clause to the like effect in the Lords, subject to a satisfactory outcome to consultations with the Church of England. The Government relied heavily on Green v The City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court to reach its conclusion that it was ‘high time that Parliament reached a settled conclusion on the issue’: they contended that the decision in Green concerning the Theatres Act reinforced the idea that the offenses appear to be moribund. On 5th March 2008, an amendment abolishing blasphemy was moved by the Government in the House of Lords. The Government’s reasons for the amendment were said to be two-fold: first, since the law ‘has fallen into disuse’, this ‘runs the risk of bringing the law as a whole into disrepute’; second, there is now ‘new legislation to protect individuals on the grounds of religion and belief’.[26] This first reason seems questionable: whilst it is true that there had been no prosecutions since 1979; the Green decision surely showed that the law was being used. The Government was on the far steadier ground in relation to its second reason: although Green showed that blasphemy still existed, it showed that the offenses had been severely curtailed. The amendment was passed by 148 votes to 87 by the House of Lords and then by 378 votes to 57 in the House of Commons.[27]


In 1860, laws were created
British India that made it a “crime to disturb a religious assembly, trespass on burial grounds, insult religious beliefs or intentionally destroy or defile a place or an object of worship, punishable by up to 10 years in jail.” Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code has been used as a blasphemy law to prevent insulting Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism.

The British-era section 295A of the penal code which was created by Christians who ruled India is extant and has not been repealed; it contains an anti-blasphemy law.

Section 295A was introduced in 1927 to prevent hate speech that insults or attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of any class of citizen with deliberate and malicious intention to outrage their religious feelings but the main purpose of this law has been to maintain “public order in a multireligious and religiously sensitive society.” An important difference between the offense in the Indian Penal Code and English common law is that the defendant must have a “deliberate and malicious intention of outraging religious feelings” in the Indian code while English common law had no such inclusion. Section 295A has, nevertheless, been used a number of times to prevent a free and honest discussion on religious issues and remains a threat to freedom of expression. The same section 295A appears in the penal codes of Pakistan and Myanmar where it is used as a blasphemy law. There have been widespread calls in India from Hindus to repeal the regressive British code. 

Prior to 2008, the last time that the UK‘s blasphemy laws were judged was in the 1970s, after long and hateful campaigns against homosexuality by some Christian groups. The matter came to a head in the legal case of R. v Lemon, raised by Christian lobbyists after a poem about Jesus published in a gay magazine. After that, the blasphemy laws became considered unenforceable and they faded from memory.
But in 2008, the public was surprised to yet again find the anachronistic concept of blasphemy on the news. A Christian pressure group tried to revitalize it in their fight against homosexuality15. The result is that on 2008 May 08, the UK‘s blasphemy laws were repealed.

In January 2008, a spokesman for Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced that the Government would consider the abolition of the blasphemy laws during the passage of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill. The Government consulted with the Church of England and other churches before reaching a decision. The move followed a letter written to The Daily Telegraph at the instigation of MP Evan Harris and the National Secular Society and was signed by leading figures including Lord Carey, former Archbishop of Canterbury, who urged that the laws be abandoned.

[1] Philip Alston & Ryan Goodman, International Human Rights, (1st Ed OUP 2012) pg.677.

[2] Ibid; Rollin M. Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law, (3rd Ed. Foundation Press 1982) pg. 474-475.

[3] Peter R. Blood (ed.), Pakistan: A country study, (6th Edition, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress 1995) pg.312.

[4] John R. de Lingen, An introduction to the Hindu faith, (Sterling publishers‟ pvt. Ltd. 2008), pg. 2.

[5] Koenraad Elst, In favour of Freedom of Expression: Section 295A as cornerstone of censorship, 2016, Vol.1, Dialogue, no.1.

[6] St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Vol.3 Part-II (2nd Ed. Cosimo, Inc. 2013) pg.1226.

[7] Leonard Williams Levy, Blasphemy: Verbal offenses against the sacred, from Moses to Salman Rushdie, (UNC Press books 1995) pg.52.

[8] Ambassador Ufuk Goksen, The Reality of Freedom of Expression in Muslim World, The Hill‟s Congressional Blog, (2012) <> accessed 16 Oct 2016.

[9] Lucy Vickers, Religion and Belief Discrimination in Employment (Europe Commission 2007) pg.26.

[10] Stephens, “The Politics of Muslim Rage”, Thursby, Hindu-Muslim: more information about the proliferation of these types of licentious publications like the Rangila Rasul and Vichitra Jivan, see Charu Gupta, Sexuality, Obscenity, Community: Women, Muslims, and the Hindu Public in Colonial India (NY: Palgrave, 2002), 247.

[11] Yale Law Journal 108 (1999): 1059-1085. Barrier, N. Gerald. Banned: Controversial Literature and Political Control in British India, 1907-1947. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1974.

[12] 4. Dr.Lakshmi T and Rajeshkumar S “In Vitro Evaluation of Anticariogenic Activity of Acacia Catechu against Selected Microbes”, International Research Journal of Multidisciplinary Science & Technology, Volume No. 3 , Issue No. 3, P.No 20-25, March 2018.

[13] Trishala A , Lakshmi T and Rajeshkumar S,“ Physicochemical profile of Acacia catechu bark extract –An In vitro study”, International Research Journal of Multidisciplinary Science & Technology, Volume No. 3 , Issue No. 4, P.No 26-30, April 2018.

[14] See the succinct and balanced account in Mark Goldie, ‘‘John Locke and Anglican Royalism,’’ Political Studies 31, no. 1 (1983): 61–85.

[15] C.S Adcock, Violence, Passion and the Law: A Brief History of Section 295-A and Its Antecedents, Journal of American Academy of Religion (Oxford University Press 2016) pp.1-15.

[16] Johannes Quack, Disenchanting India: Organised Rationalism and Criticism of Religion in India, (Illustrated Oxford University Press, USA 2011) pg.94.

[17] J. G. A. Pocock, ‘‘The History of Political Thought: A Methodological Inquiry (1962),’’ in Political Thought and History: Essays on Theory and Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 3–19; and Pocock, ‘‘The Politics of Historiography,’’ Historical Research 78, no. 199 (2005): 1–14.

[18] Wibke Kristin Timmermann, The Relationship between Hate Propaganda and incitement of Genocide: A New Trend in International law Towards Criminalisation of Hate Propaganda?, Leiden Journal of International law, 18 (The Foundation of Leiden Journal of International Law 2005) p.266.

[19] David Nirenberg, Communities of Violence: Persecution of Minorities in the Middle Ages (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996).

[20] Walter, Nicolas, Blasphemy in Britain, Rationalist Press Association. 1977.

[21] Martin Heckel, Deutschland im konfessionellen Zeitalter (Go¨ttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1983), 128–80.

[22] Berger, John, The Guardian, February 25 1989.


[24] Horst Dreitzel, ‘‘Das christliche Gemeinwesen,’’ in Die Philosophie des 17. Jahrhunderts, vol. 4, Das heilige Ro¨mische Reich deutscher Nation, Nord- und Ostmitteleuropa, ed. Helmut Holzhey and Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann (Basel: Schwabe, 2001), 673–93.

[25] See Mack P. Holt, The French Wars of Religion, 1562–1629 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Jonathan Scott, England’s Troubles: Seventeenth-Century English Political Instability in European Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and J. C. D. Clark, The Language of Liberty, 1660–1832: Political Discourse and Social Dynamics in the AngloAmerican World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

[26] For an overview of the different national religious settlements and cultures, see David Martin, On Secularization: Towards a Revised General Theory (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), chap. 5.

[27] For a recent account of the Restoration Settlement, see Jacqueline Rose, Godly Kingship in Restoration England: The Politics of the Royal Supremacy, 1660–1688 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

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